Ringworm is pre-1.0; only the latest main is supported. The daemon and the niri patch series are versioned together (see CHANGELOG.md).

Please do not open a public issue for a security problem. Use GitHub's private reporting: Security → Report a vulnerability on Mantis-Tobbogan/ringworm.

Include the ringworm version (ringworm --version), the niri version (niri msg version), and what you observed. You can expect an initial reply within a week.

The daemon is a Wayland client with two IPC surfaces, so the interesting attack surface is small but real:

• niri IPC input. The daemon parses line-delimited JSON from niri's event stream. Malformed input should never crash the daemon or corrupt memory; parser bugs are security issues.
• Control socket. $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/ringworm.sock accepts a fixed set of commands (toggle, on, off, status, reload, stop). It is created mode 0600 inside the user's private runtime directory. Anyone who can reach that socket can already run commands as you, but a way to escalate beyond that would be a vulnerability.
• Config file. ~/.config/ringworm/ringworm.conf is parsed with clamping; a malicious config should not be able to crash the daemon or draw outside its buffers.

Not in scope: the fact that the daemon needs a patched compositor, or that niri-patch/ changes niri itself (report niri bugs to niri once upstreamed).

• The daemon never reads /dev/input, never grabs the keyboard, and sets an empty input region on every surface — it cannot see your input.
• It writes to niri's IPC socket exactly once per connection (the request and the event-stream subscription), then only reads.